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A REVIEW OF THE PARDONING POWER
The power to pardon is but the counterpart of the power to,
condemn. Since the time when the memory of man runneth not
to the contrary, the power to extend mercy has been but a phase
of the authority which dispensed justice.
The earliest use of the pardon power is to be found in the
practice of the ancient monarchs. In the monarch all the powers
of government were concentrated. The smile or the frown of
an arbitrary Hebrew judge, a petty Greek tyrant, or a stern
Roman Caesar was a prophecy of sentence to coMne--a smile
meant liberty, a frown condemnation. So it is clear at the outset that the power to pardon is inextricably interwoven with the
power to administer justice.
Through those long stages of development in which government was largely dependent for its continued operation upon
the vigor and force of personalities rather than the inertia of
administrative machinery, the pardon power remained in the
hands of the monarch or chief of State. True it was limited, at
times. The Church's invention of "Benefit of Clergy," removed
all ecclesiastical offenders and also all lay offenders against clerical laws from the jurisdiction of civil law and hence limited
negatively the action of the secular authorities. De Bracton
protested against the wholesale "granting of dispensations" by
the English Kings, while the barter of pardons for favors by
Richard II played no small part in his downfall.
Strangely enough, when the theory of separation of powers
came along, causing its explosion in the political world, the
power to pardon was untouched. Either it had not been sufficiently abused to cause an outcry or men had bigger grievances
on which their attention was centered. Or men thought to make
the power of little effect in the hands of monarch or executive
by making its use essentially dependent upon action by other
departments of government. Whatever be the reason it seems
strange to us that this power judicial in character should have
been allowed to remain in the hands of the executive almost unquestioned when most of the powers of that official, judicial or
legislative in character, had been stripped from him.
Nor can we agree that this power was left in the executive
by design to serve as a check upon other departments of govern-
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ment. Examination of our own constitutional convention shows
no evidence of the pardon power being discussed in such light.
It seeims to have been considered as inhering in the executive
office and that to permit it to continue to reside there was merely
a decision which refused to experiment with a transfer of power
which was historically natural rather than a decision which left
the power with the executive as the result of a deliberate design.
Such then is a hasty sketch of the development of the
pardon power. The power in American government today is
concurrently exercised by both Federal and State Governme3nts,
but by the very nature of our divisions of governmental authority the pardoning power vested in and exercised by the State
governments is, in its effect upon crime and upon society, more
important than the same power in the hands of our Federal
Government.
Every state in the union provides for-some means of extending clemency to the criminal. Justice itself would demand
that some means of correcting the errors of the law should be
devised. In some rare cases, perhaps, justice would demand
mercy where the law condemns to punishment. This possibility
every state has cared for by creAtipg the executive power of
pardon both in constitution and by statute.
There is, however, a wide diversity among the states in the
methods provided for administering the pardoning power. If
one undertakes to make classifications of those states whose administrative machinery is somewhat similar, one must make at
least ten groups and even wide divergences will be found within
these small groups. In thirty-seven states no pardon can be
granted to a prisoner without the consent of thie governor. This
simply means that the governor has the last word in the granting or refusing of a pardon. It does not mean necessarily that
upon the governor rests the sole responsibility for extending
clemency. In fact, but four states, Arkansas, Tennessee, Virginia, and Kentucky rest the pardoning power in the governor
alone. In all other states the machinery of administration varies
in complication, although through most of the variations the
governor remains the central figure. In only five states can
clemency be granted by a board or officer without the consent
of the governor. In six more states the governor is made a mem-
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ber of a board, a majority of whom must vote in favor of a petition before a pardon can be granted; but in the thirty-seven remaining states the governor must shoulder the final responsibility.
Twenty-three states create advisory boards to act with the
governor to consider applications for pardons. It is not mandatory in these states for the governors to accept the advice of
these boards nor is his power to pardon limited to their recommendations. The boards simply serve to lift the load of considering the almost endless petitions for pardons from. the shoulders
of the chief executives. Outside of these twenty-three states
wide differences in administration exist. In Rhode Island the
pardon power may be exercised by the governor only with the
consent of the Senate. South Dakota divides the power between
the Governor and a special board. Maine requires the consent
of the Executive Council and an advisory board. So the variations continue.
Several limitations on the pardon power become apparent
at once upon a study of the state constitutions. In all but seven
states no pardon before conviction can be granted. Evidently
it was felt that such was unnecessary and was too susceptible of
abuse. Twenty-seven states forbid a pardon for treason or impeachment. There is room to believe that because these offenses
were largely subject to action by the legislature it would be a
subordination of that department to allow the governor to nullify its acts. One other constitutional limitation is almost universal. This is the provision requiring that reasons for the
pardon be given. Of course, this does not mean that the reason
must be adequate but it does mean that a reason must be assigned, however trivial. Often the reasons for pardons have
been absurd and ridiculous. One governor remitted a death
sentence because "hanging would do the man no good," another
pardoned a man guilty of larceny because "the defendant was
about to be married."
The interest and alarm manifest in the press and on the
public platform over tile so-called "crime wave" has focused
public inquiry on the relation of the governor and his power to
pardon, to the fate of the criminal. There has come to be held
by the general public an uneasy feeling that a criminal, captured
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and condemned by a process tedious and none too certain at
best, will soon re-appear to prey upon an indulgent society again.
We are fearful lest our charity has shown itself more ready to
serve the interests of the criminal than the society against whom
he has offended. And in the light of such an impression, we are
investigating the exercise of this power to extend mercy which
we have given to our governors.
Is the future of a thief, forger, or even murderer under
sentence for his crimes a hopeless one? Is the jail or penitentiary sentence a final rigid precription which must be taken,
however bitter, or can it be evaded? The facts gathered from
a few representative states will help us in giving an answer
Are pardons on the increase ? Has clemency been granted too
freely and have the governors been too lenient? The questions.
may be answered by cold figures.
In Illinois, which has one of the largest prison populations
of any state in the union, only two prisoners were granted pardons by Governor Small. This was an actual decrease over the
number granted the previous year. The same year saw only fifty-four prisoners pardoned by Governor Donahey of Ohio. Here
again we find that the number of pardons granted in recent
years has steadily declined. In Missouri, Governor Baker
granted only eighteen pardons and several of these were justified
by unusual circumstances which rarely arise. In Indiana the lowest proportion between prison population and pardons grantedwhich had occurred for ten years was achieved in 1926. Governor Fields of Kentucky pardoned seventy-six criminals in 1926
and this included those freed from jails as well as penitentiaries.
This number represents a substantial decrease over the records
of previous years. The report from Tennessee adds to the list of
those states where pardons are becoming rarer. There has been
little complaint against the pardon power as exercised by our
Governors. The facts cited as representative show that the number of pardons is actually on the decline and this in the face of
an ever increasing prison population. The person who carries
to a study of this sort the preconceived notion that he will be able
to blame the presence of criminals in society upon wholesale
releases by our Governors will be disappointed by the virtue and
xestraint exhibited by our Chief executives.
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Although sanity and conscience have characterized the use
of this power in nearly all cases, there have been some notable
exceptions. One of the charges brought against Governor Walton of Oklahoma in 1924 was his abuse of his power to pardon.
Excitement is still resounding over the activities of Mirs. Ferguson, ex-Governor of Texas, who granted over three thousand
extensions of clemency in her twenty-four months in office. Inquiries show some discontent in Michigan and there is dissatisfaction in Colorado also but these two states almost exhaust the
roll of the displeased. No wild charges that pardons promiscuously and lavishly granted are responsible for continuing the
crime wave can be supported, and with the exception of certain
notorious "political" pardons, the use of the pardoning power
has been cautious and conservative.
But just as a superstitious belief in ghosts will persist in the
face of the most intelligent argument so the feeling that something is wrong in the system of handling criminals perists in
spite of the evidence just reviewed. The impression is too deeply
inibedded'in the public mind that society is being preyed upon
by those who ought to be in jails and that fault lies at the door
of some officer or legal institution for the state of things which
prevails. Evidence does show an increase in crime and crim
inals. Crime is costing society more. Criminals are being constantly sentenced and some if not most of them for repeated
offenses. If the governors are not turning them out of the
prisons then who or what is responsible for our deluge of lawlessness ?
One does not work upon the subject of the pardon power
very long before discovering that it is inextricably bound up with
the system of paroles. The parole system provides that upon
good behavior in prison the con-vict becomes eligible for release
when some proportional part of his sentence has been served.
This release usually entails a variable degree of official supervision by prison authorities during a period varying six months
to a year. During that period of parole the convict may be imprisoned again for misdemeanors without trial, but on the expiration of a year's observation, let us say, he emerges with
society and is lost sight of if he has walked a reasonably straight
-and narrow path.
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On the face of it this would seem to be a very creditable system, that it furnishes an opportunity to the man who has come to
himself in prison to go and sin no more without going through
the body and spirit breaking effects of a long imprisonment. And
indeed, it is not with the theory of the system that we quarrel
but rather with its abuse in practice. Let the facts speak for
themselves.
The machinery for the operation of the parole system in
most of the state consists of a prison and parole board. This
board, varying in number from three to seven, functions independently of the governor save perhaps for the legal technicality of securing the Governor's signature to the acts of the
board. But for all practical purposes these boards may release
on parole any number of prisoners without restraint from any
other authority. A prisoner under life sentence in a Kentucky
penitentiary becomes eligible for parole at the end of eight years.
In New York a "lifer" may be paroled after ten years. In
Illinois only six years must elapse before paroles can be granted
to those sentenced to spend all their days in prison. The famous,
pair, Leopold and Loeb, under sentences of life and ninety-nine
years running concurrently, would have been eligible for parole,
had they behaved themselves, at the expiration of eleven yearsboth would still be young men. Of course, life or ninety-nine
years obviously constitutes the most severe sentence of imprisonment possible and hence i.t is only natural to discover that
shorter periods of imlprisonment make the convicts eligible for
paroles in a proportionately shorter time. A man given an indeterminate sentence becomes eligible for parole at the expiration of the minimum sentence. Thus a man sentenced for from
one to fifteen years is eligible for parole after one year's imprisonment.
The facts speak for themselves. Governor Fields of Kentucky allowed the recommendations of the Parole Board in fivehundred and forty-seven cases in 1926. This represents almost
one-third of the total prison population. In 1925 five hundred
four paroles were granted out of a total prison population of one
thousand six hundred seventy-three. The Illinois board released
two thousand seven hundred two prisoners during the biennium
from 1924-1926, and actually received only two thousand five
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hundred ninety-five. Ohio released in 1926 fifty-nine per cent.
of the number of prisoners received. Yet this was a huge decrease over the releases the board had previously made. In 1923
a high water mark for paroles was made with one hundred thirty-four per cent. releases. This means simply that there were
actually turned out of prison in that year thirty-four per cent.
more prisoners than were taken in. The figures from other
states are almost equally amazing. New York, Indiana, Missouri, as representative states astonish one with the lavishness of
their prison releases.
Of course, if it can be shown that to release these large
numbers of convicts is to restore to society this number of useful
men, then the parole system should be praised and not condemned. But we fear its effects are just the opposite; that it is
responsible for deluging society with these irresponsible and
lawless who have caused our widespread impression of social disorder. Almost uniformly twenty per cent. of those released on
parole violate them within the year or half-year period. Of the
remaining eighty per cent. the number who conduct themselves
circumspectly until all semblance of official surveillance has been
withdrawn and then turn to crime once more cannot be calculated but probability would place the estimate high.
A recent statement by Mr. Clabaugh, chairman of the Illinois Board of Paroles, admits that as high as forty per cent. of
those released on parole are known to violate them. In commenting on this state of affairs in Illinois Judge Kavanagh, of
Chicago criminal court, said, "If present conditions remain
during the next five years more than one hundred ninety
thousand people will have their homes or stores broken into, two
hundred twenty-five thousand others will be robbed, fifty-five
thousand to sixty thousand living, loving and useful citizens
will be assassinated. Most of the criminals who will do these
crimes are in prison waiting to get out."
It needs scarcely a second glance to assure even the most
careful investigator that here is the leak through which the dregs
of a prison population are filtering back into society. Silently,
continuously, unknown, the parole system has poured its masses
of criminals upon us to murder and pillage. For every two or
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three criminals whom we succeed in capturing, another is released.
Naturally the question arises that if this is the true explanation of the problem we are trying to solve, why has not such an
obvious solution been hit upon before, and having been hit upon
why has not some remedy been provided? The explanation
seems to lie in the administration of the state government. The
spotlight of publicity is focused upon some parts of the government illuminating those offices so brightly that the incumbents' every move is observable. But the brightness of the light
thrown around the governor's chair, for example, leaves the other
offices in even darker obscurity. Hence those acts not directly
associated with the central and dramatic figure of the governor
are likely to be overlooked entirely by a public none too well
educated in dealing with its officials.
In a majority of the states, the granting of paroles is left,
save for a technical connection with the executive power, exclusively in the hands of a board with power to grant or deny releases. Few people know of the existence of such boards. Nothing is known about their composition, their activities, their
powers. 'We have grown accustomed to look to the governor for
pardons, and indeed we must still look to him for actual pardons,
but under the parole system pardons are no longer necessary.
The publicity attending the granting of pardons by the governor
is avoided by giving paroles. One pardon granted by the chief
executive at the state capitol will attract more attention than a
dozen releases made by an obscure and unknown board working
in the shadows of the prisons. One example is sufficient.
In her two years as governor of Texas Mrs. Ferguson
granted over three thousand extensions of clemency. In Texas
however, the board of pardons also acts upon paroles and the
Governor grants the latter as well as the former. A tremendous
storm of public criticism arose over such a wholesale release of
criminals. The publicity attending the Governor's office made
every parole seem important. Yet at the same time in Illinois
and covering the same period of time, the parole board released
two thousand seven hundred two prisoners while the Governor
actually pardoned only two. If in Illinois the paroles had been
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executive acts as clearly as in Texas, is it unreasonable to suppose the same storm of public indignation would have resulted?
Our conclusions may be summarized briefly. The number
of actual pardons granted by our governors is decreasing. The
parole system is dumping criminals upon society at an alarming
rate. The parole system makes pardons unnecessary by accomplishing the same results without the attendant publicity and
responsibility. Until the system of paroling can be put under
the observation of the public, and until greater accountability
can be secured from it, the present unsatisfactory conditions
must be endured.
HAROLD W. STOKE, M. A.
Associate Professor of History aid
Political Science, Berea Oollege.

